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Following the success of the small, highly maneuverable F-86 day fighter in the Korean War, US fighter design changed to emphasize maximum speed, altitude, and radar capability at the expense of maneuverability, pilot vision, and other attributes needed for close combat. This trend reached its extremity in the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom, which was the principal fighter for both the US Air Force and Navy during the latter part of the Vietnam War.

The F-4 was originally designed as an interceptor for defense of the fleet against air attack - a mission neither it nor any other jet has ever executed, because no US fleet has come under air attack since the beginning of the jet age. Be that as it may, the F-4 interceptor was designed to meet the fleet defense mission by using rapid climb to high altitude, high supersonic speed, and radar-guided missiles to shoot down threat aircraft at long distance.

Used as a fighter rather than as an interceptor in Vietnam, the F-4 was severely miscast. Against very inferior North Vietnamese pilots flying small, highly maneuverable MiG-21s, the air-to-air kill ratio sometimes dropped as low as 2 to 1, where it had been 13 to 1 in Korea. As the Vietnam War drew to a close, it was generally agreed that the F-4 had prohibitive deficiencies including:

1. LARGENESS. F-4 pilots to frequently found themselves fighting at separation distances at which they could not see the smaller MiG-21s, but the MiG-21 pilots could see them.
2. POOR PILOT VISION. In order to minimize high-speed drag, the F-4, and all combat aircraft before the F-14, does not have a bubble canopy. It is designed for a pilot to look straight ahead. Vision down and to the sides is poor; vision to the rear is nonexistent.
3. MANEUVERABILITY. While the F-4 can pull 7G in turns, which was acceptable for that time, it can only do so by rapidly bleeding off energy (losing speed and/or altitude).
4. TRANSIENT PERFORMANCE. Ability of the F-4 to change its maneuver (that is, to roll rapidly while pulling high Gs) was poor.
5. COST. The large F-4 was an expensive aircraft to procure and maintain. This meant that, compared to the MiG-21, fewer aircraft could be bought with a given budget.
6. NO GUN. The F-4 was designed without a gun, and was thus not capable of very close combat.
7. COMBAT PERSISTENCE. While the ferry range of the F-4 was acceptable, its ability to engage in sustained hard maneuvering without running out of fuel was a significant problem.

These various sacrifices were rationalized by the belief that visual dogfighting was obsolete, and that in the supersonic age, air combat would be fought beyond visual range (BVR) using radar-guided missiles. This concept failed in Vietnam for two reasons: First, radar could detect and track aircraft but not identify them. Operating beyond visual range created an unacceptable risk of shooting down one’s own aircraft. Pilots were therefore required to close to visually identify the target before shooting; this eliminated the theoretical range advantage of radar-guided missiles. Second, the performance of the Sparrow radar-guided missile in Vietnam was poor, generally yielding less than 10% kill per shot.

Dissatisfaction with these deficiencies led to the US Air Force F-15 and US Navy F-14 designs. On this page we discuss only the Air Force programs.

The original F-15 had excellent pilot vision, including being able to see 360 degrees in the horizontal plane. It had strong high-speed maneuverability and a 20mm cannon. In addition to rectifying some of the F-4’s deficiencies, it could fly higher and faster than the F-4, and had dramatically better climb and acceleration.

It also had a powerful radar with advanced look-down shoot-down capability, and relied on the Sparrow missile as its principal weapon.

Nevertheless, an informal but influential group called the “Fighter Mafia” objected to the F-15 as moving in the wrong direction. (The most prominent Fighter Mafia spokesmen were systems analyst Pierre Sprey, test pilot Charles E. Meyers, and legendary fighter pilot John Boyd.)

The F-15, the Fighter Mafia objected, was even larger and more expensive than the F-4. Much of that money went into creating high maximum speed (Mach 2.5) and altitude (65,000 feet) and to serving as a launcher, under BVR conditions which couldn’t be used in real combat,. for the Sparrow missile which didn’t work While recognizing that the F-15 had phenomenal supersonic climb and maneuverability (it could sustain 6Gs at Mach 1.6), at such speeds it could not fight because its turn radius was so large that it could not keep the enemy in sight.

What the Air Force needed, the Mafia argued, was a successor to the WWII P-51 Mustang and the Korean War F-86 Saber: an all-new small fighter that would be cheap enough to buy in large numbers. (The F-104 was not considered a predecessor aircraft because, while it had excellent climb and acceleration, its wings were too small, leaving it deficient in range and maneuverability.) The new fighter would have revolutionary maneuverability, transient performance, acceleration, and climb at the subsonic and transonic speeds at which air combat is actually fought. It would have a gun and its primary armament would be the infra-red guided Sidewinder missile that had proven highly effective in Vietnam.

While Sidewinder’s range was limited to about three miles, the Mafia argued that air combat beyond that range was fantasy in any case. Some members of the Mafia even suggested that the ideal small fighter would have no radar at all, although this was a minority view.

In any case, the Air Force establishment wanted no part of a new small fighter, with or without radar. It was regarded as a threat to the F-15, which was USAF’s highest priority program. But the Fighter Mafia gained considerable resonance in Congress and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1971 Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard began a Lightweight Fighter (LWF) program to explore the concept.

The LWF was to be about 20,000 pounds, or half the weight of the F-15, and was to stress low cost, small size, and very high performance at speed below Mach 1.6 and altitude below 40,000 feet. Two competing designs would be chosen for prototyping.

Industry recognized, correctly, that regardless of USAF hostility, LWF variants had great potential for profitable foreign military sales, including replacing the F-104. Single-engine designs were put forward by Boeing, General Dynamics, LTV, Northrop, and Rockwell. Northrop also proposed on a twin-engine design, in effect using Air Force money to develop a replacement for its F-5 export fighter.

The Boeing and General Dynamics designs were the clear leaders from the beginning, with the Northrop twin-engine design clearly the weakest of the six.

But midway through this stage of the competition, some potential foreign buyers expressed concern over buying a new single-engine fighter. The previous single-engine supersonic export fighter, the F-104, had a troublesome safety record that some buyers were disinclined to repeat.

USAF, therefore, decided that one of the two down-selectees had to have two engines. Since the last-place Northrop design was the only twin-engine contender, it became a down-selection winner by default.

When the General Dynamics design was chosen the other selectee on merit, Boeing was no doubt a bit miffed that its loss was caused by USAF changing the rules in mid-competition. But it did not protest the decision.

Of the two surviving designs, now designated the General Dynamics YF-16 and the Northrop YF-17., the YF-17 was a relatively conventional design, to some extent an outgrowth of the F-5, while the YF-16 was an all-new design incorporating highly innovative technologies that in many respects reached beyond those of the more expensive F-15. These included -

1. FLY BY WIRE. From the outset, the YF-16 had no direct connection between the pilot’s controls and the aircraft’s control surfaces. Instead, the stick and rudder controls were connected to quadruple-redundant computers, which then told the elevators, ailerons, and rudder what to do. This had several large advantages over previous systems. It was quicker responding, automatically correcting for gusts and thermals with no effort from the pilot. It could be programmed to compensate for aerodynamic problems and fly like an ideal airplane. Most importantly, it enabled, with full safety, a highly efficient unstable design.
2. NEGATIVE STABILITY. All previous aircraft designs had been aerodynamically stable. That is, the center of gravity was well in front of the center of lift and the center of pressure (drag).
1. To illustrate the difference between stable and unstable designs, take a shirt cardboard and, holding it by the leading edge, pull it rapidly through the air. It will stretch out behind your hand in a stable manner. This is a stable design Now take it by the trailing edge push forward from there. It will immediately flip up or down uncontrollably. That is an unstable design.
2. The downside of aerodynamic stability is that the aircraft is nose-heavy and always trying to nose down. The elevator must therefore push the tail down to level the airplane. But in addition to rotating the airplane from nose-down to level, the elevator is exerting negative lift; that is, it is pushing the airplane down. In order to counteract this negative lift, the wing needs to be made larger to create more positive lift. This increases both weight and drag, decreasing aircraft performance. In pitch-up situations including hard turns which are the bread and butter of aerial combat, this negative effect is greatly magnified.
3. The YF-16 became the world’s first aircraft to be aerodynamically unstable by design. With its rearward center of gravity, its natural tendency is to nose up rather than down. So level flight is created by the elevator pushing the tail up rather than down, and therefore pushing the entire aircraft up. With the elevator working with the wing rather than against it, wing area, weight, and drag are reduced. The airplane was constantly on the verge of flipping up or down totally out of control,. and this tendency was being constantly caught and corrected by the fly-by-wire control system so quickly that neither the pilot nor an outside observer could know anything was happening. If the control system were to fail, the aircraft would instantly disintegrate; however, this has never happened.
3. HIGH G LOADS. Previous fighters were designed to take 7Gs, mainly because it was believed that the human pilot, even with a G-suit, could not handle more. The YF-16 seatback was reclined 30 degrees, rather than the usual 13 degrees. This was to increase the ability of the pilot to achieve 9Gs by reducing the vertical distance between head and heart. Additionally, the traditional center control stick was replaced by a stick on the right side, with an armrest to relieve the pilot of the need to support his arm when it weighed nine times normal.
4. PILOT VISION. In addition to allowing full-circle horizontal vision and unprecedented vision over the sides, the YF-16 canopy was designed without bows in the forward hemisphere.
5. GROWTH PREVENTION. Traditionally, room for growth has been considered an asset. Fighter aircraft have averaged weight gain of about one pound per day as new capabilities are added, cost increases, and performance declines. The F-15, for example, was designed with about 15 cubic feet of empty space to allow for future installation of additional equipment.. In a radical departure, the YF-16 was intentionally designed with very little empty space, (about two cubic feet)., with the explicit intention of preventing growth. One member of the House Armed Services Committee actually wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force asking that the F-16’s empty space be filled with Styrofoam to insure that “gold-plated junk” was not added to the design.
6. COMBAT RADIUS AND PERSISTENCE. General Dynamics chose a single turbofan engine, essentially the same engine as one of the two that powered the F-15. Use of a single engine helped minimize weight and drag; use of a turbofan rather than a pure jet engine gave high fuel efficiency. Additionally, the YF-16 designers used a “blended body” design in which the wing gradually thickened at the root and blended into the body contours without the usual visible joint. The space thus created was filled with fuel. With such a high fuel fraction and a fuel-efficient engine, the YF-16 was able to break the presumption that small aircraft were necessarily short-ranged.
7. RADAR INTEGRATION. Because the YF-16 carried no radar-guided missiles, it could only fight within visual range. Moreover, the small weight and space available limited the range of its radar. Nevertheless, it was given a technologically advanced small radar, with excellent look-down capability. Most importantly, the radar was integrated with the visual combat mode. That is, the radar projected an image of the target aircraft onto the Head Up Display so that, by looking at that image, the pilot was looking exactly where the target would become visible as he approached it.

The competing Northrop YF-17 design was somewhat larger than the YF-16, and used two smaller pure jet engines. At the price of reduced range and persistence, the YF-17 avoided the main problem of the YF-16’s turbofan: the inertia of the large fan required too long - in some cases six seconds - to spool up from idle to full power. In other respects, the YF-17 progressed better than expected, given its initial last place position.

Northrop argued that its twin-engine design added an essential safety factor, citing its experience with the small twin-engine F-5 fighter as an example. USAF did not find this persuasive, in part because a two engine plane with one engine out is useless in combat, and the probability of an engine failure was nominally twice as high with two engines as with one. The higher performance, better transient maneuverability, longer range, and lower cost of the YF-16 carried the day, and in 1976 the F-16 was chosen over the F-17.

USAF was then in the uncomfortable position of having a lightweight fighter design that could outmaneuver and outrange its pride and joy, the F-15 air superiority fighter. In real-world combat conditions, which meant Mach 1.2 or below, the F-16s held a significant edge over the F-15. To some extent this problem was solved by designating the F-16 as a “swing fighter” to do both air-to-air and air-to-ground, while the F-15 was to continue its aristocratic mission of pure air-to-air.

Probably the F-16’s greatest asset during development was its unpopularity with the USAF establishment. Knowing that their airplane was in constant threat of cancellation, the General Dynamics designers were inspired to do everything possible and then some to maintain performance and prevent cost growth. For example, while the F-15 was about 25% titanium, titanium in the F-16 was limited to 2%. As another example, a fixed engine inlet was used to hold down cost, even though a variable inlet would have given better performance above Mach 1.5.

The F-16 has been, by any standard, a success. USAF has used it heavily and successfully for air-to-ground in the 1991 Gulf war and all subsequent conflicts. The Israeli Air Force has also had great success with it.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is worthwhile to look back from the current (2003) vantage point to see how the original concept has faired

1. FLY BY WIRE has been a clear success. It is now used in essentially all military fixed wing aircraft and on many commercial aircraft.
2. NEGATIVE STABILITY, or at least reduced positive stability, has worked without a failure - no F-16s have disintegrated in air from control system failure - and is coming into increasing use.
3. HIGH G LOADS. The 9G standard pioneered by the F-16 is now universal for new fighter designs, although it is achieved more by pilot training than by hardware. Benefit of the 30-degree reclining seat back has not been clearly established, and many pilots find it increases the difficult of checking their six o’clock position while in hard maneuvers. So more recent designs have not copied the F-16 seat. Similarly, the side stick has worked well but has not proven as essential as its designers originally expected. One enduring controversy is whether control systems should, as is the case with the F-16 be programmed to unconditionally limit the aircraft to 9gs, or whether higher loads should be permitted in emergencies. One eminent General Dynamics test pilot, a “super pilot” who in his fifties was still able to sustain 9Gs for 45 seconds, published an article on the subject in “Code One”, the General Dynamics house organ, arguing that there was not enough useful benefit in being able to exceed 9 Gs to justify the strain on the airframe, particularly since few pilots could retain functionality above 9Gs. Tragically and ironically, this pilot was killed when his plane, pulling 9Gs in a hard maneuver, was unable to pull up enough to avoid the impacting the ground. This outstanding pilot might have been able to function with a brief application of 10, 11, or even 12Gs. Could that have saved him and his aircraft? Could it save others in the future?
4. PILOT VISION. Pilots like the F-16 canopy without front bows for its quietness as well as its vision. One drawback is that in order to avoid optical distortion in the bowless design, the conventional use of thick polycarbonate on the front to protect against birdstrike, and thinner polycarbonate for the rest of the canopy, cannot be used. Because the F-16 canopy uses thick polycarbonate throughout, it is not possible to eject by using the seat to puncture through the canopy. The canopy must first be blown off by small rockets, prolonging the ejection sequence slightly. On balance, the F-16 canopy concept is considered successful and it is continued in the F-22. On the other hand, neither Joint Strike Fighter candidate used full-circle vision, much less a bowless canopy.
5. GROWTH PREVENTION. The original concept of a small day ait-to-air fighter was lost before the first production aircraft. The fuselage was extended so that the single-seat versions became as long as the two-seat version, and air-to-ground capability was added. As its life progressed, the F-16 became progressively larger and heavier as more capability, including the AMRAAM radar-guided missile, chaff and flare dispensers, and more hard points were added. Still, weight gain has been only about half the traditional pound per day, so the determination of the original designers has not been in vain.
6. COMBAT RADIUS AND PERSISTENCE. The F-16 blended body has worked well, but has not been emulated in most newer designs.
7. RADAR INTEGRATION. Integration of radar with visual systems has been fully successful and is now standard fighter design.

The Exocet has four clipped delta wings at mid-body and four raked clipped-tip moving delta control fins at the rear. The missile is 4.7 m long, has a body diameter of 350 mm and a wingspan of 1.1 m. The missile weighs 670 kg and has a 165 kg HE shaped charge fragmentation warhead. Guidance in the mid-course phase is inertial, followed by an active radar terminal phase. There is also a radar altimeter to control the sea-skimming trajectory, at around 10.0 m until the terminal phase when, in calm sea conditions, the missile can descend to 3.0 m or so. The solid propellant motor gives Exocet a range of about 50 km, but when released from 10,000 m (32,800 ft) the range achieved was reported to be 70 km.

The Lockheed Martin X-35 was chosen over the competing Boeing X-32 primarily because of Lockheed’s lift-fan STOVL design, which proved superior to the Boeing vectored-thrust approach. The lift fan, which is powered by the aircraft engine via a clutched driveshaft, was technically challenging but DoD concluded that Lockheed has the technology in hand. The lift fan has significant excess power which could be critical given the weight gain that all fighter aircraft experience.

Lockheed Martin developed four versions of the Joint Strike Fighter to fulfill the needs of the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force and the United Kingdom Royal Air Force and Navy. All versions have the same fuselage and internal weapons bay, common outer mold lines with similar structural geometries, identical wing sweeps, and comparable tail shapes. The weapons are stored in two parallel bays located aft of the main landing gear. The canopy, radar, ejection system, subsystems, and avionics are all common among all different version as is the core engine which is based on the F119 by Pratt & Whitney.
Additional systems on the F-35 include:

1. Northrup Grumman advanced electronically scanned array (AESA) multi-function radar
2. Snader/Litton Amecon electronic countermeasures equipment
3. Lockheed Martin electro-optical targeting system
4. Northrup Grumman distributed aperture infrared sensor (DAIRS) thermal imaging system
5. Vision Systems International advanced helmet-mounted display

F-35 Variants
US Air Force
The Air Force expects that to purchase 1763 F-35s to complement the F-22 Raptor and replace the F-16 as an air-toground strike aircraft. The Air Force variant includes an internal gun, infrared sensors, and laser designator. This is the technologically simplest version of the JSF, in that it does not require hover or aircraft carrier capability. Therefore it does not require the vertical thrust or the handling qualities for catapult launches, augmented control authority at landing approach speeds and strengthened structure to handle arrested landings. At the same time, the Air Force F-35 will have to improve upon the high standards created by the F-16. Since replacement of the F-16 by the F-35 will entail a significant payload reduction, the F-35 faces a very demanding one shot one kill requirement.
US Navy

The requirement for carrier operations creates the largest differences between the Air Force and Navy version. The naval version has larger wing and tail control surfaces to enable low-speed approaches to aircraft carriers. Leadingedge flaps and foldable wing tip sections account for this increased wing area. The larger wing area also provides the Navy version with an increased payload capability. To support the stresses of carrier landings and catapult launches, the internal structure of this version is strengthened. In addition, the landing gear has longer stroke and higher load capacity, and of course an arresting hook is added. Compared to the F-18C, the F-35 has twice the range on internal fuel.. The design is also optimized for survivability, which is a key Navy requirement. Like the USAF version, the Navy version will incorporate an internal gun and sensors. This new fighter will be used by the Navy as a first-day-of-war attack fighter in conjunction with the F/A-18 Hornet. The Navy plans to purchase 480 JSF.

October 1995 : The first flight of F-2 prototype aircraft.
March 1996 : The delivery of the first prototype aircraft.
MHI has manufactured 61 aircraft including prototype aircraft by March 2005.

The aircraft’s flexibility was evident during the Vietnam War and, again, in Operation Desert Storm. B-52s struck wide-area troop concentrations, fixed installations and bunkers, and decimated the morale of Iraq’s Republican Guard. The Gulf War involved the longest strike mission in the history of aerial warfare when B-52s took off from Barksdale Air Force Base, La., launched conventional air launched cruise missiles and returned to Barksdale — a 35-hour, non-stop combat mission.

A total of 744 B-52s were built with the last, a B-52H, delivered in October 1962. Only the H model is still in the Air Force inventory and all are assigned to Air Combat Command. The first of 102 B-52H’s was delivered to Strategic Air Command in May 1961. The H model can carry up to 20 air launched cruise missiles. In addition, it can carry the conventional cruise missile which was launched from B-52G models during Desert Storm.

Barksdale AFB, LA and Minot AFB, ND serves as B-52 Main Operating Bases (MOB). Training missions are flown from both MOBs. Barksdale AFB and Minot AFB normally supports 57 and 36 aircraft respectively on-station.
Features

In a conventional conflict, the B-52H can perform air interdiction, offensive counter-air and maritime operations. During Desert Storm, B-52s delivered 40 percent of all the weapons dropped by coalition forces. It is highly effective when used for ocean surveillance, and can assist the U.S. Navy in anti-ship and mine-laying operations. Two B-52s, in two hours, can monitor 140,000 square miles (364,000 square kilometers) of ocean surface.

Starting in 1989, an on-going modification incorporates the global positioning system, heavy stores adaptor beams for carrying 2,000 pound munitions and additional smart weapons capability. All aircraft are being modified to carry the AGM-142 Raptor missile and AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile.

The B-52H was designed for nuclear standoff, but it now has the conventional warfare mission role with the retirement of the B-52G’s. The B-52 can carry different kinds of external pylons under its wings.

* The AGM-28 pylon can carry lighter weapons like the MK-82 and can carry 12 weapons on each pylon, for a total of 24 external weapons. With the carriage of 27 internal weapons, the total is 51.
* Heavy Stores Adaptor Beam [HSAB] external pylon can carry heavier weapons rated up to 2000 lbs. However, each HSAB can carry only 9 weapons which decreases the total carry to 45 (18 external).
* A third type pylon is used for carrying ALCMs/CALCMs/ACMs.

So the B-52 can carry a maximum of either 51 or 45 munitions, depending on which pylon is mounted under the wings. However, the AGM-28 pylon is no longer used, so the B-52 currently carries on HSABs, limiting the external load to 18 bombs, or a total of 45 bombs.

The use of aerial refueling gives the B-52 a range limited only by crew endurance. It has an unrefueled combat range in excess of 8,800 miles (14,080 kilometers).

All B-52s are equipped with an electro-optical viewing system that uses platinum silicide forward-looking infrared and high resolution low-light-level television sensors to augment the targeting, battle assessment, flight safety and terrain-avoidance system, thus further improving its combat ability and low-level flight capability.

Pilots wear night vision goggles (NVGs) to enhance their night visual, low-level terrain-following operations. Night vision goggles provide greater safety during night operations by increasing the pilot’s ability to visually clear terrain and avoid enemy radar.

Current B-52H crew size is five. Pilot and co-pilot are side by side on the upper flight deck, along with the electronic warfare officer (EWO), seated behind the pilot facing aft.
Side by side on the lower flight deck are the radar navigator, responsible for weapons delivery, and the navigator, responsible for guiding the aircraft from point A to point B. Because the H model was not originally designated for conventional ordnance delivery, weapons delivery was assigned to the radar navigator and the “bombardier/navigator” crew station designation of the earlier B-52 series was not used.)

The controls and displays for aircraft systems are distributed among the crew stations on the basis of responsibilities. The Air Force’s objective is to employ the latest navigation and communication technology to reduce the crew size to four people, by combining the radar navigator and navigator functions into one position

The Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) (formerly Hughes) AH-64A Apache is the Army’s primary attack helicopter. It is a quick-reacting, airborne weapon system that can fight close and deep to destroy, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. The Apache is designed to fight and survive during the day, night, and in adverse weather throughout the world. The principal mission of the Apache is the destruction of high-value targets with the HELLFIRE missile. It is also capable of employing a 30MM M230 chain gun and Hydra 70 (2.75 inch) rockets that are lethal against a wide variety of targets. The Apache has a full range of aircraft survivability equipment and has the ability to withstand hits from rounds up to 23MM in critical areas.

The AH-64 Apache is a twin-engine, four bladed, multi-mission attack helicopter designed as a highly stable aerial weapons-delivery platform. It is designed to fight and survive during the day, night, and in adverse weather throughout the world. With a tandem-seated crew consisting of the pilot, located in the rear cockpit position and the co-pilot gunner (CPG), located in the front position, the Apache is self-deployable, highly survivable and delivers a lethal array of battlefield armaments. The Apache features a Target Acquisition Designation Sight (TADS) and a Pilot Night Vision Sensor (PNVS) which enables the crew to navigate and conduct precision attacks in day, night and adverse weather conditions.

The Apache can carry up to 16 Hellfire laser designated missiles. With a range of over 8000 meters, the Hellfire is used primarily for the destruction of tanks, armored vehicles and other hard material targets. The Apache can also deliver 76, 2.75″ folding fin aerial rockets for use against enemy personnel, light armor vehicles and other soft-skinned targets. Rounding out the Apache’s deadly punch are 1,200 rounds of ammunition for its Area Weapons System (AWS), 30MM Automatic Gun.

Powered by two General Electric gas turbine engines rated at 1890 shaft horsepower each, the Apache’s maximum gross weight is 17,650 pounds which allows for a cruise airspeed of 145 miles per hour and a flight endurance of over three hours. The AH-64 can be configured with an external 230-gallon fuel tank to extend its range on attack missions, or it can be configured with up to four 230-gallon fuel tanks for ferrying/self-deployment missions. The combat radius of the AH-64 is approximately 150 kilometers. The combat radius with one external 230-gallon fuel tank installed is approximately 300 kilometers [radii are temperature, PA, fuel burn rate and airspeed dependent]. The AH-64 is air transportable in the C-5, C-141 and C-17.

An on-board video recorder has the capability of recording up to 72 minutes of either the pilot or CPG selected video. It is an invaluable tool for damage assessment and reconnaissance. The Apache’s navigation equipment consists of a doppler navigation system, and most aircraft are equipped with a GPS receiver.

The Apache has state of the art optics that provide the capability to select from three different target acquisition sensors. These sensors are

* Day TV. Views images during day and low light levels, black and white.
* TADS FLIR. Views thermal images, real world and magnified, during day, night and adverse weather.
* DVO. Views real world, full color, and magnified images during daylight and dusk conditions. >

The Apache has four articulating weapons pylons, two on either side of the aircraft, on which weapons or external fuel tanks can be mounted. The aircraft has a LRF/D. This is used to designate for the Hellfire missile system as well as provide range to target information for the fire control computer’s calculations of ballistic solutions.

Threat identification through the FLIR system is extremely difficult. Although the AH-64 crew can easily find the heat signature of a vehicle, it may not be able to determine friend or foe. Forward looking infrared detects the difference in the emission of heat in objects. On a hot day, the ground may reflect or emit more heat than the suspected target. In this case, the environment will be “hot” and the target will be “cool”. As the air cools at night, the target may lose or emit heat at a lower rate than the surrounding environment. At some point the emission of heat from both the target and the surrounding environment may be equal. This is IR crossover and makes target acquisition/detection difficult to impossible. IR crossover occurs most often when the environment is wet. This is because the water in the air creates a buffer in the emissivity of objects. This limitation is present in all systems that use FLIR for target acquisition.

Low cloud ceilings may not allow the Hellfire seeker enough time to lock onto its target or may cause it to break lock after acquisition. At extended ranges, the pilot may have to consider the ceiling to allow time for the seeker to steer the weapon onto the target. Pilot night vision sensor cannot detect wires or other small obstacles.

Overwater operations severely degrade navigation systems not upgraded with embedded GPS. Although fully capable of operating in marginal weather, attack helicopter capabilities are seriously degraded in conditions below a 500-foot ceiling and visibility less than 3 km. Because of the Hellfire missile’s trajectory, ceilings below 500 feet require the attack aircraft to get too close to the intended target to avoid missile loss. Below 3 km visibility, the attack aircraft is vulnerable to enemy ADA systems. Some obscurants can prevent the laser energy from reaching the target; they can also hide the target from the incoming munitions seeker. Dust, haze, rain, snow and other particulate matter may limit visibility and affect sensors. The Hellfire remote designating crew may offset a maximum of 60 degrees from the gun to target line and must not position their aircraft within a +30-degree safety fan from the firing aircraft.

The Apache fully exploits the vertical dimension of the battlefield. Aggressive terrain flight techniques allow the commander to rapidly place the ATKHB at the decisive place at the optimum time. Typically, the area of operations for Apache is the entire corps or divisional sector. Attack helicopters move across the battlefield at speeds in excess of 3 kilometers per minute. Typical planning airspeeds are 100 to 120 knots during daylight and 80 to 100 knots at night. Speeds during marginal weather are reduced commensurate with prevailing conditions. The Apache can attack targets up to 150 km across the FLOT. If greater depth is required, the addition of ERFS tanks can further extend the AH-64’s range with a corresponding reduction in Hellfire missile carrying capacity (four fewer Hellfire missiles for each ERFS tank installed).

Apache production began in FY82 and the first unit was deployed in FY86. As of November 1993, 807 Apaches were delivered to the Army. The last Army Apache delivery is scheduled for December 1995. Thirty-three attack battalions are deployed and ready for combat. The Army is procuring a total of 824 Apaches to support a new force structure of 25 battalions with 24 Apaches for each unit (16 Active; 2 Reserve; 7 National Guard) under the Aviation Restructure Initiative. The Apache has been sold to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Greece.

The Russian-developed Mi-24 HIND is the Apache’s closest couterpart. The Russians have deployed significant numbers of HINDs in Europe and have exported the HIND to many third world countries. The Russians have also developed the KA-50 HOKUM as their next generation attack helicopter. The Italian A-129 Mangusta is the nearest NATO counterpart to the Apache. The Germans and French are co-developing the PAH-2 Tiger attack helicopter, which has many of the capabilities of the Apache.
AH-64A

The AH-64 fleet consists of two aircraft models, the AH-64A and the newer Longbow Apache (LBA), AH-64D. AH-64A model full-scale production began in 1983 and now over 800 aircraft have been delivered to the U.S. Army and other NATO Allies. The U.S. Army plans to remanufacture its entire AH-64A Apache fleet to the AH-64D configuration over the next decade. The AH-64A fleet exceeded one million flight hours in 1997, and the median age of today’s fleet is 9 years and 1,300 flight hours.

The AH-64A proved its capabilities in action during both Operation Restore Hope and Operation Desert Storm. Apache helicopters played a key role in the 1989 action in Panama, where much of its activity was at night, when the AH-64’s advanced sensors and sighting systems were effective against Panamanian government forces.

Apache helicopters also played a major role in the liberation of Kuwait. On 20 November 1990, the 11th Aviation Brigade was alerted for deployment to Southwest Asia from Storck Barracks in Illesheim Germany. The first elements arrived in theater 24 November 1990. By 15 January 1991 the unit had moved 147 helicopters, 325 vehicles and 1,476 soldiers to the region. The Apache helicopters of the Brigade destroyed more than 245 enemy vehicles with no losses.

During Operation Desert Storm, AH-64s were credited with destroying more than 500 tanks plus hundreds of additional armored personnel carriers, trucks and other vehicles. They also were used to destroy vital early warning radar sites, an action that opened the U.N. coalition’s battle plan. Apaches also demonstrated the ability to perform when called upon, logging thousands of combat hours at readiness rates in excess of 85 percent during the Gulf War.

While recovery was ongoing, additional elements of the 11th Aviation Brigade began the next chapter of involvement in the region. On 24 April 1991 the 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry’s 18 AH-64 helicopters began a self-deployment to Southwest Asia. The Squadron provided aerial security to a 3,000 square kilometer region in Northern Iraq as part of the Combined Task Force of Operation Provide Comfort.

And the AH-64A Apache helped to keep the peace in Bosnia. April of 1996 saw the beginning of the 11th Regiment’s involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Elements of 6-6 Cavalry served as a part of Task Force Eagle under 1st Armored Division for 7 months. In October of 1996, Task Force 11, consisting of the Regimental Headquarters, 2-6 Cavalry, 2-1 Aviation and 7-159 Aviation (AVIM) deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Operation Joint Endeavor/Operation Joint Guard for 8 months. In June of 1998 the Regimental Headquarters, 6-6 Cav and elements of 5-158 Aviation were again deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Operations Joint Guard and Joint Forge for 5 months. The AH-64A’s advanced sensors and sighting systems proved effective in removing the cover of darkness from anti-government forces.

Army National Guard units in North and South Carolina, Florida, Texas, Arizona, Utah and Idaho also fly Apache helicopters. The Army has fielded combat-ready AH-64A units in the United States, West Germany and in Korea, where they play a major role in achieving the US Army’s security missions.

By late 1996, McDonnell Douglas Helicopters delivered 937 AH-64A Apaches — 821 to the U.S. Army and 116 to international customers, including Egypt, Greece, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The Apache is clearly one of the most dynamic and important programs in aviation and the Army, but it is not without limitations. Due to the possibility of surging the engines, pilots have been instructed not to fire rockets from in-board stations. According to current doctrine, they are to fire no more than pairs with two outboard launchers every three seconds, or fire with only one outboard launcher installed without restrictions (ripples permitted). These are the only conditions permitted. Other firing conditions will be required to be approved via a System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA).

The improvement of aircraft systems troubleshooting is a high priority issue for O&S Cost reduction. Because of funding cuts, the level of contractor support to the field has been reduced. This results in higher costs in no fault found removals, maintenance man hours, and aircraft down time. The Apache PM, US Army Aviation Logistics School, and Boeing are currently undertaking several initiatives. Upgrading and improving the soldier’s ability to quickly and accurately fault isolate the Apache weapons system is and will continue to be an O&S priority until all issues are resolved.

Prime Vendor Support (PVS) for the entire fleet of AH-64s is a pilot program for the Army, and may become a pilot program for the Department of Defense. PVS will place virtually all of Apache’s wholesale logistic responsibility under a single contract. The Apache flying hour program will provide upfront funding for spares, repairables, contractor technical experts, and reliability improvements. Starting at the flight line there will be contractor expert technicians with advanced troubleshooting capability assigned to each Apache Battalion. At the highest level, PVS represents a single contractor focal point for spares and repairs. The intent is to break the current budget and requirements cycle that has Apache at 67% supply availability with several thousand lines at zero balance.

Modernization Through Spares (MTS) is a spares/component improvement strategy applied throughout the acquisition life cycle and is based on technology insertion to enhance systems and extend useful life while reducing costs. The MTS initiative seeks to leverage current procurement funds and modernize individual system spares thereby incrementally improving these systems. MTS is accomplished via the “spares” acquisition process. MTS, a subset of acquisition reform, seeks to improve an end item’s spare components. The emphasis is on form, fit and function, allowing a supplier greater design and manufacturing flexibility to exploit technology used in the commercial marketplace.

Apache MTS focuses on the insertion of the latest technology into the design and manufacture of select spares. This is to be accomplished without government research and development (R&D) funds, but rather, uses industry investment. Industry, in turn, recoups this investment through the sale of improved hardware via long term contracts.

Modernization efforts continue to improve the performance envelope of the AH-64A while reducing the cost of ownership. Major modernization efforts within the AH-64A fleet are funded and on schedule. GG Rotor modifications were finished in April 1998,, and future improvements such as a Second Generation FLIR, a High Frequency Non-Line of Sight NOE radio, and an internal fully crashworthy auxiliary fuel tank are all on the verge of becoming a reality for the Apache.

The Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS) and the Data Transfer Cartridge (DTC) are tools for the Embedded Global Positioning Inertial Navigation Unit (EGI) equipped AH-64A aircraft that allow aircrews to plan missions and download the information to a DTC installed in the Data Transfer Receptacle (DTR). This saves the pilots a lot of “fat fingering” and eliminates the worry of everyone being on the same “sheet of music”. Other features of the DTC include; saving waypoints and targets and troubleshooting. The EGI program is a Tri-service program with the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Phalanx is a point-defense, total-weapon system consisting of two 20mm gun mounts that provide a terminal defense against incoming air targets. CIWS, without assistance from other shipboard systems, will automatically engage incoming anti-ship missiles and high-speed, low-level aircraft that have penetrated the ship primary defense envelope. As a unitized system, CIWS automatically performs search, detecting, tracking, threat evaluation, firing, and kill assessments of targets while providing for manual override. Each gun mount houses a fire control assembly and a gun subsystem. The fire control assembly is composed of a search radar for surveillance and detection of hostile targets and a track radar for aiming the gun while tracking a target. The unique closed-loop fire control system that tracks both the incoming target and the stream of outgoing projectiles (by monitoring their incoming noise signature) gives CIWS the capability to correct its aim to hit fast-moving targets, including ASMs.

The gun subsystem employs a gatling gun consisting of a rotating cluster of six barrels. The gatling gun fires a 20mm subcaliber sabot projectile using a heavy-metal (either tungsten or depleted uranium) 15mm penetrator surrounded by a plastic sabot and a light-weight metal pusher. The gatling gun fires 20mm ammunition at either 3,000 or 4,500 rounds-per-minute with a burst length of continuous, 60, or 100 rounds.

CIWS has been a mainstay self defense system aboard nearly every class of ship since the late 70’s. It was originally designed to defeat low altitude antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and was called the block 0. As antiship cruise missiles became more complex in maneuvers and ability to be detected, and warfare areas moved from open ocean to littoral environments, CIWS has evolved to meet the threat.

Block 1 incorporated a new search antenna to detect high altitude missiles, improved search sensitivity, increased the ammunition available for firing by 50 percent, a pneumatic gun drive which increased the firing rate to 4500 rounds per minute, and started using tungsten ammunition as well as depleted uranium. Block I improvements provide increased elevation coverage, larger magazine space for increased round capacity, a variable and higher gun fire rate, and improved radar and processing capabilities.

Block 1A incorporated a new High Order Language Computer (HOLC) to provide more processing power over the obsolete general purpose digital computer, improved fire control algorithms to counter maneuvering targets, search multiple weapons coordination to better manage engagements, and an end-to-end testing function to better determine system functionality.

Block 1B Phalanx Surface Mode (PSUM) incorporates a side mounted Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) which enables CIWS to engage low slow or hovering aircraft and surface craft. Additionally, the FLIR assists the radar in engaging some ASCM’s bringing a greater chance of ship survivability. Block 1B uses a thermal imager Automatic Acquisition Video Tracker (AAVT) and stablilization system that provide surface mode and electro-optic (EO) angle track. These Block 1B enhancements will allow day/night detection capability and enable the CIWS to engage small surface targets, slow-moving air targets, and helicopters.

Baseline 2C improvements provide an integrated multi-weapon operations capability. During integrated operations, the command system controls CIWS sensors, target reports, mode employment, and doctrine. The sensors are utilized to provide 360 degree search and track coverage, while providing track data to, and receiving designations from, the Command system. This CIWS installation includes a conversion kit for each weapon group to facilitate ease and safety of maintenance; the “maintenance enclosure” kit installs the below-deck equipment for a gun mount in a prefabricated enclosure with the mount located above it.

Over a three month period in early 1998, nearly 4,000 shipyard workers, Sailors and contractors completed $65 million in repairs (over 500 major jobs) in the Complex Overhaul of the dry-docked Kitty Hawk. All four of the Hawk’s screws were repaired (number three was replaced), and all the line shaft bearings were replaced. Containments were built around the shafts to maintain temperature and humidity levels while complex fiberglass work was completed. For the rudders, large holes were cut through the decks, and the rudders and all associated systems were removed. Refurbished rudders were then removed from the decommissioned carrier USS Ranger while that ship was in the water, to be re-machined and installed on the Hawk.

The aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk departed from Naval Air Station North Island on 06 July 1998, ending a 37 year relationship with the city of San Diego. USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) departed to Yokosuka, Japan, on 15 July 1998 where it replaced USS Independence (CV 62) as part of a planned rotation of forward-deployed naval forces. USS Kitty Hawk arrived in Yokosuka in August 1998. Less than a week after arriving in her new homeport, civilian contractors from US Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), working with Kitty Hawk Sailors, began over 150 separate jobs. Projects range from repairing water-tight doors and hatches to replacing corroded deck drains. While a majority of the tasks are taking place in out-of-the-way areas, the largest job was replacing non-skid on the Flight Deck. Non-skid is an epoxy/sand compound used to protect the metal decking from corrosion and to provide traction for aircraft and personnel.

Built at the New York Naval shipyard as the second ship in the “Kitty Hawk” class of aircraft carriers, USS CONSTELLATION has more than 30 years of service, which have seen it sail from Yankee Station off the coast of Vietnam to the Gulf of Oman in the Indian Ocean. In February 1990, USS CONSTELLATION departed San Diego, returning to the East Coast for a three-year overhaul. The $800-million Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), completed in the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in March 1993, added an estimated 15 years to the carrier’s operational life. The overhaul saw upgrades to virtually every system on the ship, from the galleys to the engine rooms, and the flight deck to the anchors.

USS Constellation’s Combat Systems Suite is one of the most advanced and capable in the fleet. SPS-48E three-dimensional fire control, TAS missile targeting and SPS-49 long-range air search radar systems operate together to allow the ship’s Tactical Action Officer to accumulate and assess all hostile contacts. Enhanced by worldwide satellite communications and high frequency data links, information is available for anyplace, at any time. Other state-of-the-art systems, include the Aircraft Carrier Data system, Super High Frequency communications, Automatic Identification and Tracking, Joint Tactical Identification, and Positive Identification, Friend or Foe.

The Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) can show charts of most of the world’s waterways with the simple click of a button. It automatically plots the ship’s position by Global Positioning Satellite and keeps a complete record, alleviating yet another time consuming job aboard ship. Available on less than half of the Navy’ ships, ECDIS was installed aboard Constellation before its most recent Western Pacific deployment. Also new to the ship is the Flat Panel Display. Seven such displays, strategically placed around Constellation’s Bridge and Auxiliary Conn, give the crew instant access to every piece of ship control data available on one notebook sized screen. The displays also make complex computations, such as what course and speed will create enough head wind to launch aircraft from the waistcatapults, automatically.

The recent integration of a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) computer system with the existing UNIX based system is the first step in a project that will ultimately provide a system which is easier to work with and maintain, and which will be substantially smaller and cheaper to operate. New software gives the Aerographer’s Mates (AG’s) the ability to detect holes in land-based radars and track overhead orbiting polar satellites and download their images. With the new computer, AG’s can log onto the classified Internet and check the status of weather, download imagery from orbiting satellites, or “chat” with other Navy weather commands in real time. This new equipment is the prototype to a METOC system that’s still on the drawing board - Tactical Environmental Support System Next Century (TESS NC). The Navy is currently using the TESS 3 version. With TESS NC, several Pentium processors in the OA Division office will be linked and provide the same functions as the current equipment, while generating a substantial savings of time and money.

USS Constellation’s Intelligence Center (CVIC) recently augmented its intelligence capabilities with satellite communications and digital imagery technology. These new systems will allow the center to form a more complete and accurate picture of the battle space. The new satellite communication system Challenge Athena III (CA III) allows data to be transmitted and received at the rate of 1.54 megabytes per second, a near real-time connection with the rest of the battle group and other intelligence centers around the world. Digital imaging systems such as the Joint Services Imagery Processing System-Navy allow the battle group commander to plan and execute tactical Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strikes by receiving images over the CA III satellite. Other new imagery systems include a Vexcel Scanner and Digital Camera Receiving Station (DCRS). The DCRS, in combination with the F-14 Tactical Aircraft Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) allows CVIC to collect near real time digital images from an airborne F-14 aircraft. Finally, CVIC has installed secure video teleconferencing equipment which can use the CA III satellite. These new systems have made Constellation’s CVIC a powerful, versatile intelligence gathering center able to operate independently in a variety of operational situations.

USS CONSTELLATION returned to San Diego on July 22, 1993, following its third transit around Cape Horn at the tip of South America. On April 1, 1997 USS CONSTELLATION beginning a six month deployment to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. The USS Constellation Battle Group replaced the USS Kitty Hawk Battle Group which had been forward deployed for six months to a variety of regions including the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In October 1997 the USS Constellation battle group returned home on schedule after a highly successful six-month forward deployment to the waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Arabian Gulf. Carrier Air Wing Two (CVW-2), flew over 1,000 sorties in support of Operation Southern Watch enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq.

USS America CV-66, a slightly modified variant of the Constellation, was de-comissioned on 09 August 1996 after a surprisingly short active career spanning three decades, and is presently in inactive reserve in the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF), Philadelphia, PA. America returned from its last deployment 24 February 1996, where its squadrons flew 250 combat missions over the skies of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ship and crew also distinguished themselves during Operation Desert Storm. America is the only carrier to have launched strikes against Iraqi targets from both sides of the Arabian Peninsula: Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The aircraft carrier was commissioned Jan. 23, 1965, at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. During its second deployment, America assisted with the rescue and medical treatment of crew members from the technical research ship USS Liberty (AGTR 5) after it was attacked by Israeli torpedo boats and jet fighters, June 8, 1967. America also completed three deployments off the coast of Vietnam, where it spent as many as 112 consecutive days on station.

The de-comissioning of USS America made room in the active fleet for the newly comissioned CVN-74 USS John C.Stennis. USS Constellation is slated for replacement by the new CVN-76 Ronald Reagan in 2003. USS Kitty Hawk is slated for replacement by the as yet un-named CVN-77 in 2008.

The primary mission of the A-10 is to provide day and night close air combat support for friendly land forces and to act as forward air controller (FAC) to coordinate and direct friendly air forces in support of land forces. The A-10 has a secondary mission of supporting search and rescue and Special Forces operations. It also possesses a limited capability to perform certain types of interdiction. All of these missions may take place in a high or low threat environment.

Specific survivability features include titanium armor plated cockpit, redundant flight control system separated by fuel tanks, manual reversion mode for flight controls, foam filled fuel tanks, ballistic foam void fillers, and a redundant primary structure providing “get home” capability after being hit. Design simplicity, ease of access and left to right interchangeable components make the A/OA-10 aircraft readily maintainable and suitable for deployment at advanced bases.

The A-10/OA-10 have excellent maneuverability at low air speeds and altitude, and are highly accurate weapons-delivery platforms. They can loiter near battle areas for extended periods of time and operate under 1,000-foot ceilings (303.3 meters) with 1.5-mile (2.4 kilometers) visibility. Their wide combat radius and short takeoff and landing capability permit operations in and out of locations near front lines. Using night vision goggles, A-10/ OA-10 pilots can conduct their missions during darkness.

The A/OA-10 is a single place, pressurized, low wing and tail aircraft with two General Electric TF-34-100/A turbo-fan engines, each with a sea level static thrust rating of approximately 9000 pounds. The engines are installed in nacelles mounted on pylons extending from the fuselage just aft of and above the wing. Two vertical stabilizers are located at the outboard tips of the horizontal stabilizers. The forward retracting tricycle landing gear incorporates short struts and a wide tread. The nose wheel retracts fully into the fuselage nose. The main gear retracts into streamlined fairing on the wing with the lower portion of the wheel protruding to facilitate emergency gear-up landings. The General Electric Aircraft Armament Subsystem A/A49E-6 (30 millimeter Gun System) is located in the forward nose section of the fuselage. The gun system consists of the 30mm Gatling gun mechanism, double-ended linkless ammunition feed, storage assembly and hydraulic drive system.

Avionics equipment includes communications, inertial navigation systems, fire control and weapons delivery systems, target penetration aids and night vision goggles. Their weapons delivery systems include head-up displays that indicate airspeed, altitude and dive angle on the windscreen, a low altitude safety and targeting enhancement system (LASTE) which provides constantly computing impact point freefall ordnance delivery; and Pave Penny laser-tracking pods under the fuselage. The aircraft also have armament control panels, and infrared and electronic countermeasures to handle surface-to-air-missile threats.

The Thunderbolt II’s 30mm GAU-8/A Gatling gun can fire 3,900 rounds a minute and can defeat an array of ground targets to include tanks. Some of their other equipment includes an inertial navigation system, electronic countermeasures, target penetration aids, self-protection systems, and AGM-65 Maverick and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.

Thunderbolt IIs have Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS), compatible single-seat cockpits forward of their wings and a large bubble canopy which provides pilots all-around vision. The pilots are encircled by titanium armor that also protects parts of the flight-control system. The redundant primary structural sections allow the aircraft to enjoy better survivability during close air support than did previous aircraft. The aircraft can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles up to 23mm. Their self-sealing fuel cells are protected by internal and external foam. Their redundant hydraulic flight-control systems are backed up by manual systems. This permits pilots to fly and land when hydraulic power is lost.

The Thunderbolt II can be serviced and operated from bases with limited facilities near battle areas. Many of the aircraft’s parts are interchangeable left and right, including the engines, main landing gear and vertical stabilizers.

The first production A-10A was delivered to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., in October 1975. It was designed specially for the close air support mission and had the ability to combine large military loads, long loiter and wide combat radius, which proved to be vital assets to America and its allies during Operation Desert Storm. In the Gulf War, A-10s, with a mission capable rate of 95.7 percent, flew 8,100 sorties and launched 90 percent of the AGM-65 Maverick missiles.
Service Life

The original service life of the A/OA-10 was 8,000 hours, equating to approximately to FY2005. The revised service life was projected out to 12,000 hours, equating to approximately FY2016. The most recent long range plan has the A/OA-10 in the fleet through FY2028, which equates to approximately 18,000-24,000 hours.

A/OA-10 modifications are aimed at improving the A/OA-10 throughout the its service life. All modifications are integrated between ACC, AFRC, and ANG, with the Guard and Reserve often funding non-recurring engineering efforts for the modifications and ACC opting for follow-on production buys. Budgetary constraints are often best overcome by this type of arrangement. Two types of modifications are conducted on the A/OA-10, those to systems, structures and engines, and those to avionics. Structure, system and engine modifications aim at improving reliability, maintainability and supportability of the A/OA-10 and reducing the cost of ownership. Avionics modifications continue the metamorphosis of the A/OA-10 from a day visual flight rules (VFR) fighter to a night-capable integrated weapon system.

A/OA-10 avionics modifications provide for greater interoperability between the Army and Air Force by improving situational awareness, tactical communication, navigation and weapon system accuracy, and providing additional capabilities in the areas of threat detection and avoidance, low-level flight safety, stores management and employment of “smart” weapons. In addition, modifications are sought to reduce cost of ownership and to remove supportability quagmires such as obsolete parts. Modifications to the A/OA-10 are nearly always interdependent—interdependence maximizes combat capability of the A/OA-10 by interconnecting modifications in distributed avionics architecture. Integral to the improvement of the A/OA-10 is a new acquisition strategy centered on a recently acquired prime contractor for the weapon system. The prime contractor will be the integrator of all major weapon system modifications and provide the continuity necessary to accommodate the downward trend in organic manpower and relocation of the System Program Office.

A large portion of the systems sustaining engineering is for contingency use throughout the fiscal year and is utilized to investigate mishaps, resolve system deficiencies, develop engineering change proposals, or to establish new operational limits. Specific requirements cannot be forecast, but general needs can be predicted based on actual occurrences since the A/OA-10 program management responsibility transferred to SM-ALC in 1982. The objectives of the sustaining engineering and configuration management programs are to reduce spares utilization, reduce hazard potentials and to increase the weapon system’s effectiveness. Sustaining Engineering is mission critical and will be used to obtain the non-organic engineering services needed to maintain and improve the design and performance.

The A/OA-10 weapon system was originally designed for manual pilot operation and control. In 1990, the aircraft was modified to incorporate the Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancements (LASTE) System. This system provided computer-aided capabilities including a Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS) to issue warnings of impending collision with the ground, an Enhanced Attitude Control (EAC) function for aircraft stabilization during gunfire and a Low Altitude Autopilot system, and computed weapon delivery solutions for targeting improvements. The LASTE computer system installation added the requirement for an Operational Flight Program (OFP) to provide the computer control software necessary to perform the above functions.

Commencing in 1999, the A/OA-10 fleet was additionally upgraded with the installation of an Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (EGI). In conjunction with this aircraft modification, a replacement Control Display Unit (CDU) will be installed with its own separate OFP software.

Operational capability changes, mission changes, latent system deficiencies, and additional user requirements dictate the necessity of periodic OFP block change cycles (BCC) to maintain the weapon system operational requirements. The current BCC includes the LASTE OFP changes, but will additionally require the CDU OFP updates to be accomplished concurrently following the installations of EGI/IDM Modification. Following installation of the original LASTE System, corrections to original system deficiencies, added user requirements, and now the pending EGI modification program have increased the total requirements for the LASTE computer hardware to its maximum design capability. Implementation of the current OFP software change will result in maximum utilization of the computer’s memory and throughput, precluding any further operational change requirements from being implemented. In anticipation of this hardware limitation, engineering Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) project was initiated in 1993 to develop options to correct this deficiency. This project is developing an engineering hardware unit, along with an updated OFP software program, for test and evaluation.

The addition of the LASTE system and the pending installation of the EGI/CDU system have greatly increased the complexity of the A/OA-10 weapon system, including the troubleshooting and maintenance requirements. Also, the implementation of the 2-level maintenance system, eliminating the intermediate-level maintenance capabilities at the operating units, has necessitated improved troubleshooting capabilities at the unit levels to maintain the aircraft operational readiness requirements. An Operational Test System (OTS) has been developed to provide a computer test aid for the organizational maintenance units to expedite their maintenance actions. The OTS contains a software test program that requires periodic updates to maintain compatibility with the LASTE and CDU systems, as well as other A/OA-10 avionics systems.

TF-34 engines are essentially two level maintenance via user Queen Bee sites at Barksdale, Davis-Monthan and Shaw AFBs. All ACC aircraft TF-34 engines are repaired at Davis-Monthan or Shaw AFB. Shaw AFB also supports USAFE. PACAF uses a combination of two and three level maintenance; Osan AB utilizes regional support provided at Kadena AB, while Eielson AFB performs Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance (JEIM) on-sight. Barksdale AFB regionally supports AFRC. The ANG remains entirely supported by base field JEIM shops. Depot level engine maintenance is accomplished by the Navy at Jacksonville NAS, FL. The A/OA-10 has 51 avionics line replaceable units that transitioned to two level maintenance.

The A/OA-10 was designed for user maintenance in all normal maintenance inspections and tasks. This design has been very successful for this aspect and there is every expectation this will continue for the life of the weapon system. The only depot level requirements are Analytical Condition Inspection (ACI) and unscheduled depot level repair.

ACI is a specialized inspection to check areas, sub-systems or parts that are not checked on any periodic basis during normal maintenance. The purpose of the ACI is to find developing problems that might affect the mission or ensure such conditions do not exist. Problems discovered during ACI result in engineering studies that determine appropriate corrective action. There are 11 ACI aircraft selected (by usage, age, flight hours and environment) from different bases and MAJCOMs that are scheduled per fiscal year. The ACIs are accomplished at OO-ALC.

Unscheduled depot repair occurs when an aircraft incident, accident or other unusual occurrence creates a problem beyond the users ability to correct. Such occurrences result in a request from the MAJCOM for depot assistance. Depending on the situation, the aircraft may be inducted into a depot or contractor facility, or a depot or contractor field team may be dispatched to the location of the aircraft.

The A/OA-10 has a requirement for repaint every eight years. The fleet size sets the current requirement to approximately 65 per fiscal year. While this is not strictly a depot requirement, the need for a fixed, specialized and environmentally contained facility limits the user in his choices. The A/OA-10 is primarily painted atOO-ALC; however, Daimler-Benz AG in Germany paints USAFE aircraft. For economic reasons the 11 ACI aircraft inducted into OO-ALC each year are also painted.